Safer World: January 2007


Safer World

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In Good Faith : An Indian View of Secularism

Tuesday, January 30, 2007

I saw the moving drama of the Indian people in the present, and could often trace the threads which bound their lives to the past, even while their eyes were turned towards the future. - Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India

We are all a part of the Social Contract. We were not delivered here by our choice but now that we have chosen to call this our home, we are entitled to an honorable life--for each one of us. We, the people of India, have come of age. Today, after more than half a century of freedom behind us, we stand at the crossroads of our destiny. As responsible citizens we have to make some decisions together--to earn our fundamental freedoms and dignity of life. Who will grant us these rights? Who will ensure that we tide over our differences and move over the path of progress? Do we allow the storm of differences to divide us permanently or the breeze of solidarity to bring us together? How do we tame the enormity of our dissimilarities? When will we ensure justice, equality, liberty and fraternity to all our brethren?

The Wonder of the Past

Scarcely in the history of human civilization does one find a land as diverse and yet as promising as India. Since centuries, this land, ensconced within the commanding heights of the Himalayas and the deep waters of the Indian Ocean, has beckoned visitors from far and wide--alluring them with its variety and natural wealth. Home to some of the earliest civilizations of the world, human life prospered leisurely in its fertile plains. The warm landmass, home to the Indus Valley civilization was relentlessly sought by tribes and groups of people who poured in from the mountain passes and the seas. Fabled as the "Golden Sparrow" of the East, its fame inspired numerous adventurers during the medieval ages and later the European sailors during the Age of Exploration. As the Vedic religion emerged from the Aryan civilization, the land was frequented by numerous other peoples--Persians, Parthians, Bactrians, Scythians, Huns, Mongoloids, Turks, early Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians and Greeks. Later, from the rugged mountains of the North arrived the Afghans and the Mughals. Some came as conquerors; others came as visitors and scholars. Finally the majority was "Indianised"--absorbed in the philosophy and ethos of India. In the bargain, foreigners left their lasting impressions on the culture of the land. Thus the inclusive nature of India was evident throughout the progress of civilization. Lastly the Europeans tried their luck in India. The British stayed the longest, in the process introducing us to the mixed bag of Western mores. They left eventually, but not before sharing some customs with us. It is this remarkable feature of India that impresses the most--the ability to accept unfamiliarity, bear unsettlement, reinvent and emerge like the phoenix.

The Yoke of History

The same glorious past that lends us our cultural pride has bestowed upon us some of the darkest curses of mankind. Our inheritance has been flawed and imperfect. The evil of the caste system continues to irk us even into the twenty-first century. This fissiparous custom has kept millions subjugated and oppressed, denying them the dignity that we all seek. Officially illegal, the ghosts of the caste system continue to haunt the rural heartlands of India posing a huge challenge to social justice and development. The history of medieval conflict between Hindu and Muslim kingdoms, followed by the horror of Partition, continues to seethe the embers of communal hatred. Likewise the ugly chapters of violent evangelism and inquisition serve as fodder to the perverted mind. Nationalism often simmers up to fascist ideology and religious bigotry when it derives inspiration from such flawed perception of history. Routinely, extremist groups and religious bigots twist history to spread their divisive philosophy.

Apart from, communal tensions, class struggle, rooted in the antiquated caste system is very much evident in our country. Now it has assumed a much more complex nature with the benefits of economic reforms percolating in an asymmetric manner within the society. The Naxal movement is a manifestation of this very class struggle. On a less severe scale, a number of dissimilarities and prejudices continue to berate our nationhood. Prominent among these are language chauvinism, moral policing and regionalism.

The Story So Far

Even as we hail the success of our democracy since our "tryst with destiny" began fifty-nine years ago, we grapple with the gross failure to cultivate a sense of togetherness among the masses. Our social fabric continues to be riddled with recurring cases of communal violence, intolerance, regional narrow-mindedness and discrimination. While the Constitution and various other canons provide for a just and secular framework, we have not been able to live up to the ideals espoused by our founding fathers. The easier option is to blame the government or the politicians but some would say the people only get the rulers they deserve. Progressive and tolerant voices have always spoken up against intolerance, even at the cost of being jeered and heckled as pseudosecularists. For long their voice was suppressed, for it was a weak voice, overpowered by the clamor of hatred and malevolence. Not anymore; after a series of communal clashes and incidents of violence, there has been a definite shift towards objectivity and justice in the Indian psyche. So what can we citizens do to strengthen this swing towards unity?

The Way Ahead

Hitherto the role of the Government has been limited to inclusion of "moral lessons" in school syllabi, advertisement campaigns promoting "unity in diversity" and maintenance of law and order. Unfortunately, instances are replete where the lawmakers themselves have turned a blind eye towards religious violence, caste discrimination and other forms of persecution. Though the Constitution guarantees us religious freedom and equality, nowhere does it encourage the state to promote religiousness amongst the people. As things stand today, religion is inseparable from the Indian way of life. It is precisely why we find some politicians and partisan interests dabbling in religion and creating a rift within society. The loud nature of religious activity in India is an antithesis to social harmony. Though religion and faith are often described as the sheet anchors of Indian consciousness; they should best remain a matter within the private domain of individuals. At most, religious rituals can be occasionally practiced to preserve the cultural characteristics of a community. The freedom to practice and preach any religion cannot be reduced to exhibitionism. This is not to suggest that atheism or agnosticism has to be promoted. As citizens we need to keep our religious leanings private and celebrations as unobtrusive as possible for others. The present scale of religious activism in India bears potential to create discord, especially amongst the socially deprived and uneducated poor. The opium of religion cannot be allowed to sedate the hungry millions who desperately need dignity, roti, kapda and makan. Once the public appeal of religious ritualism weans down, the scourge of bigotry which feeds on the differences will tail away too.

The leadership crisis in the country can be tackled if liberal and educated citizens pick up the gauntlet against marginalization and divisive politics. Extremists and fundamentalists of all hues need to be exposed by the citizens themselves. Religious and community leaders representing the underprivileged must be goaded by aware citizens to shun divisive agendas. This can be the first step towards rejection of bias and rebuttal of fanaticism.

Differences can be softened very effectively when there is a convergence of economic interest. Perhaps, we Indians, through our years of Nehruvian socialism and "closed economy," completely missed this fact. Interregional business dealings, trading and overseas migration for employment bears potential to downplay prejudices and promote inclusiveness. In that regard, the economic reforms, resting on the precepts of globalization and liberalization, are a step in the right direction.

True to the democratic character of our polity, the print and electronic media have emerged as the powerful voice of the people. Certain publications and television channels have demonstrated astounding ingenuity and perseverance in their public-oriented reportage. We citizens owe a great deal to the men and women of the Fourth Estate who work for the common cause with missionary zeal. Through the space available to them in the media, citizens need to speak out when they encounter injustice or discrimination. Socially-responsive reporting wields the power of shaping public opinion and attitude.

The government on its part needs to empower the underprivileged with quality basic education and employment opportunities. Only then can the vast Indian majority become capable of grasping the nuances of civility and communal amity. We have come a long way as a nation state, managing our differences and similarities. On our run with the hare of progress we can ill afford to hunt with the hounds of intolerance. We owe a great deal to our founding fathers who envisioned a plural, just and vibrant society. To once again usher in the golden age of social harmony, together we must resolve to cut the Gordian knot.

Beyond Liberal Democracy: Political Thinking for an East Asian Context

Friday, January 26, 2007

In this collection of essays, Bell makes a compelling case for what he calls "morally legitimate alternatives to Western-style liberal democracy in the East Asian region" (8). Although the largest part of the book focuses on Chinese speaking countries such as China, Taiwan, and Singapore, Bell rightly characterizes the book as addressing issues that tend to apply to other East Asian societies and political cultures. Its concerns are wide-ranging, with essays devoted to topics as various as Confucian just war theory, the viability of democratic regimes in East Asia, and the advantages of characteristically Japanese, Korean, and Chinese forms of capitalism. Despite the eclectic nature of this collection, most of its essays are united by the shared goal of articulating reasons to temper some of the West's most treasured political ideals so as to suit the distinctiveness of East Asian cultures and political traditions.

With just a few exceptions, most of these essays are aimed at undermining what Bell sometimes calls "liberal fundamentalism" (339). This is the view that certain liberal values, such as the commitment to free speech rights or the principle of one-person one-vote, should be secured in all political societies regardless of economic or cultural circumstances. I call it a "disposition" rather than an "ideology" because (as Bell seems to admit) it is not a systematic position that many liberals explicitly endorse but an insidious tendency that they manifest on a case-by-case basis. Appropriately, then, Bell's book focuses on the particular cases in which liberal principles are regarded as either inviolable or, at best, rightly suspended only under extraordinary circumstances. In three sections, Bell addresses what he calls the "main pillars of liberal democracy": human rights, democratic government, and capitalism (323).

The first section of the book focuses on human rights. It begins with an explication of Confucian "just war theory," noting a "realist" strain of thought in Mencius that justifies war when it has some chance of success, and when it is waged either in defense of one's own people or for the sake of liberating others from a tyrant (so long as the oppressed peoples are likely to welcome their liberators). The second chapter of this section addresses a number of disputes about the appropriateness of ascribing "rights" to East Asian political traditions, and whether distinctively Asian rights should take priority over the sorts of human rights championed by Western countries and international institutions such as the U.N. This chapter shows Bell at his best, cutting through much of the impassioned rhetoric to show where the substantive normative issues lie, and noting that many apparent debates about rights are actually disputes about sociological and economic facts. Both at the conclusion of this chapter, as well as in the following chapter on the successes and blunders of international human rights NGOs, Bell makes a powerful case for leaving the prioritization of competing rights to community advocates and hands-on human rights workers rather than theorists or foreign governments.

Also in this section, Bell embraces the view that talk of "rights" is appropriate for Confucian political traditions, observing that imperial legal codes and the classical Confucian thinkers themselves recognized many entitlements and duties that "belong to human persons simpliciter, independent of their roles" (63). Like Bell and many others, such as Joseph Chan and Stephen Angle, I agree that there are well-established precedents in the Confucian tradition for modern rights talk. An important issue that Bell's analysis raises, though, is whether these rights (or proto-rights) were meant to have any bite. Even if Confucian societies have recognized role-independent entitlements that those in positions of power are supposed to observe, it does not follow from this that the subjects of that power were legitimately entitled to enforce them. That is, it is not clear that these rights came with an endorsement of popular remedies, such that people would be morally justified in engaging in civil disobedience or rebellion. Without this additional prerogative, the ruler's subjects are left in a predicament often attributed to the citizens of the Hobbesian state: morally entitled to baseline good treatment from their sovereign, but morally prohibited from enforcing it against the sovereign. In my view the Confucian classics are deeply ambivalent about such a prerogative. Mencius famously distinguishes between the killing of a "true king," which is forbidden, and the killing of a king who has lost his moral entitlement to rule (Mencius 1B8). But so much depends upon whether the people themselves are authorized to decide when a king has lost his entitlement to rule or whether such judgments are properly left to "Heaven" or some other authority. I find no clear answer to this in the classical Confucian tradition.

Bell devotes his second section to dispelling some (but not all) of the allure of establishing Western-style democratic regimes in East Asian contexts. He begins with a primarily historical essay on the relationship between public sponsorship of athletics in ancient Greece and China. He then offers two stimulating chapters that defend certain forms of government by elites over and against government by democratic representatives. The first of these elaborates upon his previous work on Confucian democracy, where he offered a novel way of blending representative democracy as found in the West and a Confucian conception of rule by a scholarly elite. Bell proposes a bicameral legislature with an upper house of scholar-officials chosen by civil service exams (often associated with the seventeenth century Confucian reformer Huang Zongxi) and a lower house of representatives chosen by popular vote. The lower house, Bell argues, will provide an important democratic check on flagrant abuses of power. The upper house will provide a check on the democratic propensity to pander to short-term interests and selective constituencies.

Bell's second essay on democracy defends elitism by arguing that in East Asia, less-than-democratic regimes have proven to be better than democratic regimes at protecting the interests of minorities. On this topic Bell continues his ongoing dispute with the liberal defender of minority rights Will Kymlicka, arguing on the strength of considerable evidence that Kymlicka's expectations of liberal democratic regimes are not borne out in East Asia. Bell then concludes with a chapter that defends his approach to multicultural education, building on an evocative personal account of his first experience in teaching a multicultural curriculum in Singapore.

Of all of the essays included in this collection, I have the strongest reservations about Bell's defense of elitism, even when construed more benignly as a blend of democratic rule and rule by scholar-officials. To make his case, Bell relies heavily on the assumption that the elites will sustain a stronger interest in the long-term good of the whole than would democratically elected representatives. This is, obviously, an assumption well worth debating. To Bell's credit, he offers several institutional regulations and procedures that could help to reinforce these benevolent tendencies. But even if we grant the controversial claim that they can be suitably reinforced, I am not certain that elite rule offers the better path to Bell's stated goals. Take, for example, the need to protect minorities from tyrannical majorities. Surely a better-tested approach would be to entrust this power to a robust and independent judiciary rather than to the discretion of a deliberative body, for insofar as the protection of minority rights is at the discretion of anyone, even a well-intentioned group of scholar-officials, the rights of minorities will be subject to debate and reconsideration. Minority rights are guarded more vigilantly by professionals who see it as a prescribed duty than by legislators who see such rights as an open question. This does not mean that they should be immune from revision, but at least they deserve the firmness and stability of something like a constitutional mandate rather than a set of policies that are easily amended. Surely the rights that tend to be the most difficult to protect (such as the rights of minorities to a decent life) are worth treating as a fixed point of departure for judicial officials.

Bell concludes with three insightful chapters on East Asian capitalism. In the first of these, he explores the classical Confucian texts for a clearer understanding of their views on property rights. Bell observes that Mencius endorsed policies of minimal taxation, held that the price of most goods should be determined by the people, and condemned state-imposed import duties. He then draws out some distinctive Confucian constraints on private property rights, including provisions for the material subsistence and moral development of the most disadvantaged, ownership rights that are vested in families rather than individuals, and a stipulation that wealth not be acquired by unscrupulous means.

In including this last constraint Bell might read too much into the classical texts -- the passages he cites only suggest that unscrupulous acquisition is worthy of moral condemnation, not necessarily of regulation. Read as a justification for government regulation, moreover, one wonders whether it wouldn't in fact open the door to a great deal of state intervention, making classical Confucianism much less friendly to free exchange than Bell would like to believe.

In the second chapter of this section, Bell argues that several of the distinctive features of current East Asian capitalism are well suited to the cultural backgrounds and economic circumstances of many East Asian countries, and should be preferred over their East Asian (and paradigmatically American) alternatives. These include allowances for powerful, centralized governments to favor certain industries over others, reliance on social networks for winning employment and facilitating transactions, family-based ownership of businesses, and protection of the needy through primarily "informal" means such as voluntary family care.

The third chapter on capitalism is the most eye-opening. In it, Bell attempts to justify the practice of hiring foreign domestic workers (FDWs) without extending them equal citizenship, thus defending a practice that many liberal democrats find to be morally questionable. Bell's general strategy is to show that the current system is the lesser of many evils. He argues that the unequal status of long-term FDWs is the only viable alternative to large-scale illegal (and unsupervised) employment, and the only way to provide opportunities to a significant number of financially destitute people. Here Bell seems to recommend the status quo as a desperate if woefully inadequate remedy for the greater injustice of global inequality. Although I am deeply ambivalent about Bell's conclusions, which seem to me to condone something like permanent second-class status, this chapter nevertheless offers the most forceful defense of the status quo that I have yet seen.

Having addressed his three pillars of liberal democracy, Bell concludes with a refreshingly candid chapter on methodology. In it, he lists some of the best-known methodological objections that those who work across traditions are likely to encounter, describing them as objections that were routinely raised when he presented versions of the essays found in this volume. Bell then contrasts his understandably defensive "real responses" to these objections with the more thoughtful and diplomatic "ideal responses" that occurred to him long after the debates had concluded. Anyone who works across traditions is sure to sympathize with Bell, and is likely to share at least some of his impatience with various attempts to offer definitive accounts about the proper approach to comparative work.

This collection of essays touches upon the most heated debates about the blending of East Asian and Western traditions. As such it might seem to be a drop in the bucket of an already vast and rich body of literature. But in my view it nevertheless qualifies as one of the most important recent contributions of its kind, for it effectively fills two crucial if somewhat neglected niches in the existing literature. First, it is particularly successful at answering the concerns of scholars who work primarily on Western political thought. These are not essays that will be intelligible only to those who are already steeped in Chinese philosophy or politics. Bell takes great pains to provide his readers with the historical and cultural background necessary to understand his arguments. He also offers interesting accounts of his early, bumbling attempts to come to grips with the concerns and passions of his East Asian students and colleagues, all of which effectively take the reader through many of the revelations that led Bell himself to his current views. As a work that is particularly accessible to specialists in Western politics, Bell's arguments address themselves effectively to the audience that most needs to hear them.

A second distinctive feature of this book is that it injects considerable specificity into a series of debates that are sometimes dominated by sweeping, speculative claims. In this sense Bell stands to much of the existing literature as someone who repairs sinks and steam-pipes might stand to empirically impoverished theories of plumbing. His work will come as a relief to those who prefer to see the comparison and synthesis of complex political traditions in action before drawing grand, theoretical conclusions about how it should be done. For these reasons, Bell's collection of essays is not just a highly stimulating contribution but an indispensable one as well.

Daniel A. Bell, Beyond Liberal Democracy: Political Thinking for an East Asian Context, Princeton University Press, 2006, 379pp., $24.95 (pbk), ISBN 9780691123080

Islam and the West (2)

Thursday, January 25, 2007

For the most part, atheists and agnostics cannot speak openly about their beliefs. In many countries, statutory sanctions apply to Muslims converting to other faiths (apostasy). The death sentence may only be imposed in a few countries, but the penalties under civil law are often draconian enough.

Religious communities such as the Alevis, who have pursued their own path for centuries, or the Ahmadiyya movement and the Baha'i, who broke with the Islamic community in the 19th century, face discrimination or outright persecution in most Islamic societies. This adds a further bone of contention to the relationship between the Muslim and Western worlds, particularly as the West has come to regard freedom of religion as a core element of any enlightened society.

The Muslim world never experienced a Western-style enlightenment, not that this would necessarily guarantee democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, as European history demonstrates - a fact that cannot be overstressed. Enlightenment is, however, a prerequisite for a more judicious attitude toward the professed superiority of a community's own religion (not, however, as regards its claim to possessing the absolute truth, which the Christian church also asserts) and toward its own history. Most Muslims lack critical detachment when it comes to their heritage. Enlightenment, however, needs to originate from within and reflect its specific context.

Candidates for reformation

It is worth noting that Muslim reformers cannot effect a reformation in the spirit of Martin Luther, because Islam lacks a clerical hierarchy invested with the authority to offer indulgence for sins - the very thing that outraged the German. In Islam, there are no sacraments and no ordained clerics; "laypersons" are not excluded from reciting sacred texts. While translations of the Koran were long considered taboo, a more relaxed attitude now prevails. Muslims may consult translations, carefully labeled as "interpretations" of the Koran, but the Arabic original must be recited at religious services etc.

Iran may be the most likely candidate for a reformation. Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the Shiite clergy has asserted a monopoly on political leadership. Even contentious within Shiite ranks, this is rejected as patently un-Islamic by the Sunni majority in the Muslim world. For Sunnis there can be no such thing as a ruling clergy.

It is both pointless and counterproductive to insist that Muslims must embark on their own reformation and enlightenment if they wish to be part of the modern world. Deliberate provocations are similarly counterproductive, such as the defamation of the Prophet, which goes beyond a simple reproduction of the Prophet's image; contrary to popular belief, such representations exist in Islamic art.

It is perfectly possible to preserve and defend the fundamental right to freedom of speech, to artistic and intellectual freedom, without insisting on reopening this particular wound. This does not mean capitulating to violent zealots. But it does mean showing due respect to the religious sensitivities of Muslims. Insulting the Prophet is hardly likely to foster a critical and enlightened examination of Islam. Quite the contrary.

Supporting the forces of reform - in ways that reflect their needs - would make sense, as long as these are not presented as champions of a modern Western society. Or worse, as political partners of the West; this can only serve to discredit them in their own communities.

An explosive topic

It is no accident that reformist and liberal forces often portray themselves as vehement critics of American, Israeli and even European policies. Current perceptions of Islam are, after all, intimately associated with the imbalance of political power between the Muslim and Western worlds. Which brings us to an important issue, one worth considering in its historical perspective.

Today, Islam's relations with the West are such an explosive topic that one could easily assume it has never been otherwise. In reality, Europe did not become the Islamic world's principal point of reference until well into the modern era. Islam evolved in the Middle East, where its adherents continually rubbed shoulders with Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians - who represented neither Europe nor the West.

Hardly any aspect of Islamic religion, art and culture would be conceivable without this cross-insemination, be it the exegesis of the Koran, theology, law, mysticism, literature, music, architecture or political theory. But today's Muslims find it difficult to appreciate that Islamic culture is the product of numerous and manifold influences, because Islamist leaders promulgate the view that Islam is based exclusively on the Koran and the exemplary practices of the prophets, the Sunnah.

Modern politicians would do well to remind all parties of these interconnections, and refrain from idealizing them when doing so. After all, these contacts have all too frequently been the spark that has ignited religious and political controversies. The ensuing religious debates have tended to become competitions in which the aim was to emerge victorious by proving the opposing side wrong.
What about the Crusades?

Elements of material culture often migrated in one direction or the other as a result of military campaigns. Many architectural masterpieces were created by craftspeople and master builders who had been captured by invading armies - a circumstance that by no means negates the reciprocal cultural enrichment.

Christian Byzantium and Europe were just two regions involved in this process. Iran and central Asia played a key role for centuries, as did India in some fields. To the caliphate of Baghdad, Sicily and the Iberian Peninsula seemed very remote - a kind of "Wild West." Al-Andalus, Islamic Spain, has certainly had more significance for Europeans than it has in the Islamic world, as a memorial to how things once were and how they might have remained.

And what about the Crusades, which are so eagerly discussed today? In their own age, they had more impact on Europe than on the Islamic world, excepting those Muslims in the region between Southern Anatolia, Syria and Egypt. It was there that Muslim princes and scholars mobilized against the Crusaders in the name of jihad, in a holy war that was primarily defensive in nature.

The caliph in Baghdad, however, took no part in it. His gaze was trained eastward, toward Iran and Transoxiana. The Crusades did not shatter the Islamic world. That was left to the Mongol hordes of the 13th and 14th centuries, led by Genghis Khan and Timur. They devastated the area from Samarkand to Baghdad and Damascus (the Maghreb remained untouched).

By contrast, the effects of European colonialism were extensive, profound and traumatic, and are still in evidence today. Europe's colonial powers began their conquest of the Islamic world in the 18th century, subjugating India and what today is Indonesia. By the 19th century they had penetrated to the Arabian outreaches of the Ottoman Empire. It is all too easy to forget that the colonial era is recent history in both the Arab world and Iran. Europe's colonial influence reached its zenith after World War I, when it established protectorates and mandates on the territories of the former Ottoman Empire.

Foundations for close ties

Germany, of course, was not a colonial power in the Islamic world, but France was in the Maghreb, Syria and Lebanon; Great Britain in Egypt, Palestine, Iraq, India and Malaysia; Italy in Libya; Spain in Morocco and Mauritania; and the Netherlands in Indonesia.

Turkey alone managed to win independence after the war ended. For all practical purposes, Iran was under foreign control. Decolonization only began in earnest after World War II: India became independent in 1947, Algeria in 1962, the former Trucial States of the Persian Gulf a decade later. Chronologically speaking, the colonial era seems less remote to its victims than the Third Reich and Prussian Empire seem to Germans, even if very few of today's Muslims actually witnessed it.

Today, the impact of colonialism seems mixed. It colors perceptions of the West's policies and its attempts to exert influence, particularly where Israel and the protection of domestic minorities are concerned - a right the European powers have traditionally claimed. It also, however, laid the foundations for those close ties that have shaped patterns of migration, fostered political and strategic cooperation, and underpinned cultural exchange. Britain, France and the Netherlands are the most obvious examples.

Today, the Islamic and Western worlds are more closely linked than ever; they have become positively enmeshed. This closeness creates commonalities, but also sources of friction. Christians are much more likely to argue about God with a Muslim than with a Hindu. Yet Muslims, Christians and Jews can build on a common legacy, a common context that should, in principle, make any debate about values easier.

The concept of human rights unquestionably evolved first in Christiandominated Europe and the United States. However, the underlying principles are viewed as universal. They cannot be understood solely as the outgrowth of a Judeo-Christian tradition; the West has no monopoly on human rights. Equality, justice, human dignity, protection of the environment, and the elimination of poverty and violence are relevant to everyone.

It has become fashionable to deride interreligious and even intercultural dialog and to dismiss it as irrelevant. But talking makes sense if there is a clearly defined goal. Dialogue helps bring "others" and indeed the "self" into sharper focus. It can highlight the differences between Islam, Islamism and violence committed in the name of Islam, and may even help the West internalize the distinctions. In the best-case scenario, it can reduce the risk of Islamic terrorism. It cannot, of course, prevent nuclear armament in the Middle East, ease migratory pressures or solve the Palestinian conflict. But then none of these is primarily a religious problem.

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Islam and the West

Wednesday, January 24, 2007
The Islamic scholar Gudrun Krämer discusses tolerance and freedom of religion among Muslims, the role of the Crusades and colonialism in today's conflicts, and the mistakes made by Western critics.

Something is rotten in the relationship between the Islamic and Western worlds; there is a diffuse but pungent odor of fear and mistrust. The unease has primarily to do with the issue of violence: violence that permeates the past and the present, violence in all its glory - honor killings, suicide attacks, the Crusades, colonialism, the Taliban, Abu Ghraib, sharia, headscarves, youths rioting in France, jihad, Israel, insulting the Prophet, and freedom of speech. What a tangle!

Europe, the West and Christendom have all but become synonymous, as have the Middle East, the Islamic world and Islam itself. Theory and practice, unalloyed doctrine and tainted practice are all blithely muddled together. Political conflicts assume the mantle of cultural clashes and vice versa.
As so often, perceptions weigh at least as heavily as facts. However, in this case the bare facts are daunting enough. Once upon a time, a clear distinction between "Islam" and "the West," may have been possible. But no longer. The boundaries are blurring: Millions of Muslim men and women live in the West and many are citizens of Western nations. They are therefore now inextricably part of the West.

The resulting conflicts are very real

Conversely, the West has left its mark on the Islamic world; through its politicians and generals, but also through its materialism, technologies, communication tools and organizational paradigms, things with which only hermits can completely avoid contact. The resulting conflicts are very real.

Yet, given the current European propensity for viewing reason as a Christian legacy and themselves as sole heirs to the Enlightenment, it ill befits Europe's residents to cast reason aside whenever their relationship with Islam and Muslims is at issue. Let us begin with religion. Germans particularly are wont to portray the Judeo-Christian tradition as the cornerstone of European identity and culture - however tenuous and contentious the realities may be. Islam does not even merit a mention.
Educated commentators might, at best, make passing reference to Islamic Spain, where the Greek classics were translated by Muslim and Jewish scholars and exported to the Christian West. This may secure those scholars a modest place in Europe's cultural heritage - albeit as mere messengers, rather than as thinkers in their own right. From a religious perspective, however, their existence matters little.

For centuries Christians regarded Mohammed as a false prophet; even today few Christians would probably consider him a true prophet. The Islamic attitude toward Judaism and Christianity is quite different. Islam sees itself explicitly as belonging to the same monotheist tradition as its two sister faiths embody. It connects to them, relates to them, but at the same time considers itself superior. Just as the New Testament succeeds the Old Testament for Christians, the revelation of Islam concludes the chain of revelations for Muslims. The Torah and the Gospels are respected, but it is the Koran alone that contains the true message. Moses is a prophet, Jesus is a prophet, but Mohammed is the "Seal of the Prophets."

It isn't exactly clear where Jews and Christians fit in when Islam distinguishes between believers and non-believers - although the distinctions are no less rigidly delineated than those between Jews and non-Jews, or Christians and heathens, in the West. In some passages, the Koran refers to them as believers, but in others they are conscripted into the great army of unbelievers that Muslims must fight with every resource available. From a theological perspective, this is a complex issue, because the Koran and Islamic theologians hold that believing in Christ as the son of God is perilously close to polytheism, for it suggests that Christians do not worship a single God. This point, like so many others, highlights the extent to which the Koran - treated by most Muslims as the unadulterated word of God, to be understood verbatim - requires and has always required interpretation.
Such an assertion inevitably offends fundamentalists, who hold fast to a literal reading of the scripture and believe it must be followed without any "ifs" or "buts." The assertion is nevertheless valid - and thinking Muslims have always admitted as much.

Pragmatic tolerance

In practical terms, the situation has been somewhat more straightforward. Jews and Christians enjoyed the protection of the Muslim authorities. They were, after all, recipients of a scripture of revelation, who, like Muslims, believed in the one and only God - albeit, from an Islamic point of view, in a diluted form. Hence the designation dhimmi ("protected person") applied to both Jews and Christians living under Islamic rule. This exemptive status explicitly distinguished them from the non-believers who were the Muslims' predefined enemy. In exchange for the payment of special tributes, their independence was guaranteed and they were protected from physical violence.

In the course of the Islamic conquests in southern and southeastern Asia, Hindus and Buddhists were granted a comparable status, although these faiths were scarcely monotheistic. Muslims were as capable as anyone else of differentiating between religious and political necessity. Consequently - with Islamic conquests serving to extend Islamic rule - they exercised a pragmatic tolerance.

Like all foreign invasions, these conquests involved violence or at least the threat of violence, a fact that many of today's Muslims are reluctant to acknowledge. Not unlike the West's former colonial powers, they prefer to cast themselves in an altruistic role, with invasion and occupation masked as a mission civilisatrice. As a rule, however, Muslim conquerors did not force subjects to convert to Islam, which most scholars believe is explicitly prohibited in the Koran (Sura 2, Verse 256: "There is no compulsion in religion.").

The picture is scarcely rosy

In such circumstances, tolerance was closer to toleration, not tantamount to acknowledging that members of other faiths were equal in religious terms or deserved the same rights. But that attitude also prevailed in Europe until well into the 19th century. Equality for religious minorities under the law is a relatively recent concept. And Europe for one has experienced more than its share of problems when trying to put this idea into practice.

If tolerance in the sense of toleration is the yardstick, the Islamic world cuts a far better figure than historical Christendom, although here too the picture is scarcely rosy. The Renaissance may have seen outstanding cultural achievements in Europe, but it was in no sense harmonious - not even in Islamic Spain, which is often retrospectively idealized as a "golden age" of peaceful Muslim, Christian and Jewish coexistence.

Even under Islamic rule, some members of other faiths were persecuted, forced to convert or subjected to pogroms. These, however, were the exception, not the religiously sanctioned rule. In any comparison with Europe - whether during the Christian-dominated Middle Ages, the Reformation or the era of totalitarianism (which, we might remember, postdated the Enlightenment) - "Islam" emerges as the clear moral victor.

The present situation is different. With a few highly publicized exceptions, religious tolerance is still exercised in predominantly Islamic societies. Today, however, toleration is not enough. There are demands - mainly, but not exclusively, from the West - for religious minorities to be granted the same legal rights and, by extension, for freedom of religion. In most chiefly Islamic societies, the religious and legal categories derived from the Koran have remained in force. Consequently, non-Muslims are denied equal rights in some walks of life. They can be hindered from maintaining and renovating their churches, monasteries, synagogues and temples; they are not allowed to proselytize; and, not infrequently, they are barred from certain functions and offices.

That is not only true of countries like Saudi Arabia where sharia law applies, and the authorities obstruct the practice of other faiths. It also holds good for a country like Turkey, which regards itself as secular. This is partly due to the frequent equation of "Turkish" with "(Sunni) Muslim" - a politicization of religion rejected by most Muslims outside Turkey.

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The Power and the Potential of India’s Economic Change

Tuesday, January 23, 2007
All eyes are on China as it races to become the world’s next great power. Smart bettors would be wise to put some money on India to get there first, and Edward Luce explains why in “In Spite of the Gods: The Strange Rise of Modern India,” his highly informative, wide-ranging survey.

Mr. Luce, who reported from New Delhi for The Financial Times from 2001 to 2005, offers an Imax view of a nation so enormous that it embraces every possible contradiction. Always it seems to be teetering on the edge of either greatness or the abyss. Right now the future looks inviting.

India’s dizzying economic ascent began in 1991, when the government abruptly dismantled the “license raj,” a system of tight controls and permits in place since independence in 1947. Mr. Luce, as you might expect from a Financial Times reporter, does a superb job of explaining the new Indian economy and why its transformation qualifies as strange.

Unlike China, India has not undergone an industrial revolution. Its economy is powered not by manufacturing but by its service industries. In a vast subcontinent of poor farmers whose tiny holdings shrink by the decade, a highly competitive, if small, technology sector and a welter of service businesses have helped create a middle class, materialistic and acquisitive, along with some spectacularly rich entrepreneurs.

“If Gandhi had not been cremated,” Mr. Luce writes, “he would be turning in his grave.”
Mr. Luce, notebook in hand, matches faces to trends as he tours India from the affluent, relatively well-governed south to the poor, hopelessly mismanaged north, where the age-old problems of illiteracy, poverty, government corruption and caste divisions persist.

Much of the book consists of interviews and colorful vignettes intended to illustrate the myriad statistics that, out of context, can numb the mind. The blend of anecdote, history and economic analysis makes “In Spite of the Gods” an endlessly fascinating, highly pleasurable way to catch up on a very big story.

As Mr. Luce dryly observes, “India never lacks for scale.” This is a country where 300 million people live in absolute poverty, most of them in its 680,000 villages, but where cellphone users have jumped from 3 million in 2000 to 100 million in 2005, and the number of television channels from 1 in 1991 to more than 150 last year.

India’s economy has grown by 6 percent annually since 1991, a rate exceeded only by China’s, yet there are a mere 35 million taxpayers in a country with a population of 1.1 billion. Only 10 percent of India’s workers have jobs in the formal economy. Its excellent engineering schools turn out a million graduates each year, 10 times the number for the United States and Europe combined, yet 35 percent of the country remains illiterate.

Despite its robust democracy and honest elections, India faces the future saddled with one of the most corrupt government bureaucracies on earth. Mr. Luce encounters a woman in Sunder Nagri, a New Delhi slum, whose quest for a ration card entitling her to subsidized wheat and other staples involved bribing an official to get an application form. The form was in English, which she could not read, so she had to pay a second official to fill it out. When she turned up to claim her wheat, it was moldy and crawling with insects. The store owner had evidently sold his good government wheat on the black market.

In the northern state of Bihar, Mr. Luce writes, more than 80 percent of subsidized government food is stolen. Most ration cards are obtained through bribery, by Indians who are not poor. It’s the same story in nearly every area of an economy touched by the groping tentacles of a government that “is never absent from your life, except when you actually need it.”
As a former cabinet official tells Mr. Luce, corruption is not simply a nuisance or an added burden on the system. Rather, he says, “in many respects and in many parts of India it is the system.”

Mr. Luce, traveling the country’s rickety rail system, covers an enormous amount of ground. He inquires into the Kashmir dispute while dissecting India’s fraught relationship with Pakistan; marvels over New Delhi’s spanking-new subway system; describes the middle class rage for megaweddings; pays a visit to Bollywood and, in some of his most absorbing chapters, analyzes the changing caste system, the status of India’s Muslims and the alarming rise of Hindu nationalism.

All this and a visit to C2W.com, a Mumbai company that markets brands through the Internet, cellphones and interactive television shows. Its founder, Alok Kejriwal, is still in his 30s, and to Mr. Luce represents the new India.

“I am greedy,” he tells the author. “I have no trouble admitting to that.”

At one point, Mr. Luce ponders India’s constant state of chaos and compares it to a swarm of bees. From inside the swarm, things look random, but from the outside, the bees hold formation and move forward coherently.

Sometime in the 2020s, at current growth rates, India will overtake Japan to become the world’s third-largest economy. Greatness lies within its grasp, Mr. Luce argues, if it can figure out a way to restructure its inefficient agriculture, put millions of desperately poor people in jobs that pay more than a pittance, wake up to a potential H.I.V.-AIDS crisis and root out
government corruption.

Mr. Luce takes a cautiously optimistic view. “India is not on an autopilot to greatness,” he writes. “But it would take an incompetent pilot to crash the plane.”

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Big Brother row points to mature India

Monday, January 22, 2007
White English people are ignorant stupid racists.

It's a sweeping, inaccurate generalisation but it's the impression that might have been left in the minds of millions of people in India who last week watched one of their own being, to use the English vernacular, 'slagged off' mercilessly on British TV.

Contrary to much of the reporting around the world Shilpa Shetty is not a major Bollywood star. If she was she would not have shared a stage with the British B-grade celebrities also stuck inside the 'Big Brother House'.

The programme makers wouldn't have been able to afford her pay cheque. But while she may not have been the darling of the big screen in India before she entered the reality show, she'll emerge, regardless of the means of her exit as a darling of the Indian middle class.

Onslaught

There has been a palpable sense of pride with the way she has dealt with what is widely seen here as racist foul mouthed onslaughts from her clearly under educated boorish English companions.
But more interestingly the incident has also shown that India, contrary to the fears of British diplomats, has become comfortable enough with its position in the world to see things like the 'Big Brother' row in perspective.

The Indian media has had a feeding frenzy on this story. It's dominated the headlines and been wall to wall across the dozens of new TV news channels that have sprung up over the last few years.
What there hasn't been is a knee jerk xenophobia against the British, in response to an India woman being abused by descendants of the old Raj.


For many years India had a real chip on its shoulder about the UK. The injustices of the colonial era were never far from the surface. Given an opportunity Indian leaders would fall over themselves to take a dig at the British for an easy bit of popular press.

The best example of this was when the then Prime Minister IK Gujral publicly called the UK a 'third rate' country in petulant response to a perceived sleight from the British entourage out for the 50th anniversary of India's independence.

Future greatness

I'm sure that if the Big Brother controversy had been played out then, the reaction of the Indian media would have much more akin to the kind of aggressive nationalism displayed by the British tabloids against the French.

But as India this year prepares to celebrate its 60th anniversary of independent rule one thing seems to be clear.

India has stopped looking over its shoulder at the past. It no longer views itself through the prism of its colonial past.

The 'Britishers' are no longer the bogeymen they used to be because India is no longer suffering from the inferiority complex it used to have. India no longer feels the need to dwell on past injustices because it's too busy getting ready for what many predict will be its future greatness.

There has been outrage here at the treatment of Shilpa Shetty. But there has also been acknowledgement that there has been equal outrage in the UK from brown, black and white people alike.

The condemnation by Britain's political class from the Prime Minister down has received the same attention as the comments from the Indian Government. The only exception to this measured response were the half dozen chaps in Bihar who found their fifteen minutes of fame by burning a rather bad effigy of the Channel Four executives.

But no one in India is going to claim that the actions of a few underemployed Biharis, which was recycled endlessly on TV around the world, represents the rest of the nation.

So despite the shrill cry from the British media, there was never any chance that this was going to become a diplomatic incident during the visit of Britain's Finance Minister Gordon Brown.

His entourage were probably having kittens when the media started asking him about this story but the reality is that today's Indian leadership is much more interested in solidifying its place in the international pecking order than scoring cheap points off the likely next British Prime Minister.

Better educated

One English commentator noted after the row erupted that "Shilpa Shetty has taken the supposed British virtues of civility, articulacy, reserve and having a stiff upper lip and shown that.. we lack them".

That's not all India does better than the UK these days. In terms of their celebrity status Shilpa and her nemesis Jade Goody are almost on a par.

But taken as a snap shot of like-for-like India's B-grade celebrities are clearly better educated, better mannered and frankly speak better English than their UK counterparts.

Unfortunately for the UK it's not just Indian celebrities. British companies have been outsourcing their customer service centres, software departments, biotechnology labs etc to the subcontinent for years now.

They did so because they recognised a huge pool of well educated English speaking middle class people that could do the job not only cheaper than the folks back home, but often better.

Jade Goody clearly believed that her behaviour would be tolerated by the British public watching outside. She was wrong.

Ms Goody has earned the ire of many in the UK for trashing its reputation across the world. Her antics also over shadowed Mr Brown's trip here.

But long term she may have helped Mr Brown make a fairly important point to the British public.
Gordon Brown had never set foot in India before last week. But he already knew the challenges its huge pool of young people posed to the UK economy. He outlined the challenges in his annual economic review late last year.

Ms Goody articulates in her crassness the fact that your average English speaking Indian (most of whom have been through private schooling) is a lot better educated than your average English person. And by the way there are probably more than a hundred million of them.

If you're British then Shilpa Shetty in all her well mannered educated politeness is lot more scary that Jade Goody could ever hope to be.

The Next Jewish Challenge

Saturday, January 20, 2007
They've tackled gay ordination. Now it's time to address intermarriage
Not even a month has passed since the Jewish Conservative movement decided that it is now permissible for its rabbinical schools to admit openly gay people—and a new initiative, no less momentous, is already in the making. The 76 Schechter day schools in the United States and Canada, which admit only children who are Jewish according to Jewish law—born to a mother who is Jewish or has converted to Judaism—will now be more "flexible": They will soon begin to admit students with Jewish fathers.

Conservative Judaism is a movement torn between conservatism and liberalism, being squeezed between its two competitor branches of Judaism—Orthodoxy on the right and Reform on the left. Orthodox Jews adhere to ancient religious law in everyday life, and Reform long ago rid itself of those archaic constraints. Conservative Jews walk the middle ground: They follow halacha, or Jewish law, but try to make it more adaptable to the needs of current generations, a delicate and always complicated maneuver in these times of polarization. The great game of Jewish evolvement has a clear pattern. Take a look at Reform Judaism, and you'll see where Conservatives might be tomorrow. Take a look at Conservative Jews, and you'll see what the Orthodox will need to debate even later. For instance, the chief question facing many Orthodox scholars now concerns women's participation and equality—something the Conservatives overcame back in 1955 with their ground-breaking decision to give Jewish women the right to Aliyah, the honor of making the blessings during Torah reading in the synagogue.

The decision on gay ordination—and on allowing gay commitment ceremonies—provides a perfect example for the way it is done. The rabbis debated the issue for a decade and a half, rejecting both gay ordination and commitment ceremonies for reasons of halacha first. Then, a couple of weeks ago, they reversed their decision in the most bizarre way imaginable. The Committee on Jewish Law and Standards—25 rabbis who constitute the movement's supreme institution of halacha—approved a tshuva (responsum) that keeps homosexual anal sex illegal (according to Jewish law) while still permitting homosexual relations.

This decision was the culmination of quite a pandemic debate. Does the "lying with a male" that is proscribed for males in the Torah (Leviticus 18:22) refer only to the technical act of penetration, or is it a comprehensive prohibition on sexual contact between males (and, by implication, between women, too). Some rabbis were adamantly arguing that such distinction is no more than a hypocritical way to make the wrong right—but more thought it was a way out of a crippling discussion that was hanging over the movement, and making its members, most of them quite liberal, very uncomfortable.

For Conservatives, with the gay controversy over, the new issue might be the widespread phenomenon of mixed marriage. Hence the issue of accepting the sons and daughters of Jewish fathers (as opposed to Jewish mothers) to Schechter schools—a small step, signifying more to come. The Reform decided in 1983 to get rid of the matrilineal orthodoxy and emphasize the Jewish upbringing as the definitive element of Jewishness. Matrilineal descent was not the biblical practice and was probably adopted during the second Temple period. There is more than one theory explaining why: Some think it was the number of Jewish women raped by non-Jews, some believe it was borrowed from the Romans, and there are scholars who think it was a response to intermarriage.
The Reform movement's decision was based on the rising number of intermarriages: They didn't want to lose all those youngsters. The Conservatives, though, still adhere to the old tradition. But as they look for ways to boost declining membership, they will have no choice but to turn to the growing population of Jews who marry someone of a different faith.

Conservatives haven't yet reached the point of hard decisions. For now, they are just making it easier for children of intermarriages to join, on the condition that they convert to Judaism before their bar mitzvah. But one should not envision this decision as an isolated case of better marketing. Whether the rabbis and leaders are ready to accept it or not, they are entering the treacherous fields of Jewish identity in the age of intermarriage.

And Conservatives, following the sister Reform movement, will probably get to the point of more acceptance. They need members, and the members marry, and the marriage isn't always to someone whom the rabbis recommend. This trend, though, has its strange ways and conflicting results. As the Orthodox follow the Conservative, who follow the Reform—but the Reform are now trying to turn the train back. Mixed marriage, they realized, has become a custom too powerful and destructive to ignore.

Two weeks ago, in Ha'aretz, I wrote about a new study examining intermarriage and its implications on American Jewish society. "We are developing into two distinct populations," according to professor Steven Cohen, a leading scholar on American Jewish life. "The identity chasm between in-married and intermarried is wide, which suggests the imagery of 'Two Jewries.' " He concluded, "Intermarriage does indeed constitute the greatest single threat to Jewish continuity today."

Jews are a small minority in America, and their number around the world is insignificant—12 million to 13 million. If Jewish Americans will keep marrying non-Jews (and there's no sign they are going to stop), future generations will see an even smaller percentage and a smaller number of Jews. And the fewer people you have, the less likely you are to find a spouse from the tribe. So, this is not only a train that's going fast—but rather one that will be going ever faster.

And leaders of the Reform movement understand this. A year ago, in the biennial convention of the Reform movement, the head of the movement, Rabbi Eric Yoffie, delicately reminded his crowd that there's a time to permit, but also a time to forbid: "By making non-Jews feel comfortable and accepted in our congregations, we have sent the message that we do not care if they convert. But that is not our message," he preached, urging a more aggressive approach to conversion. "The time has come to reverse direction by returning to public conversions and doing all the other things that encourage conversion in our synagogues."

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The State of the Jihad

Wednesday, January 10, 2007
The year of 2006 has seen some interesting developments in the fight against al-Qaeda and its allies across the globe. While the war against al-Qaeda is largely seen as a fight in Afghanistan supported by a police action in certain countries, there is a very hot war occurring in many countries. Al-Qaeda and its allies have initiated hot wars in lesser known countries such as the Philippines, Chechnya, Somalia, and Algeria. Thailand is fighting a serious insurgency against ill-defined groups of Muslim insurgents which haven't been definitively connected to al-Qaeda or the Southeast Asian powerhouse Jemaah Islamiyah, but we don't believe in coincidences.

Iraq, which is often dissociated from the war, is a major theater for al-Qaeda, as both Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri have stated in numerous communications. Afghanistan has seen its bloodiest year since the U.S. invasion in late 2001. The Taliban and al-Qaeda have fought the Pakistani government to a standstill and have taken over portions of the country. The countries of Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and Bangladesh simmer, and continue to serve as support bases for al-Qaeda's activities.

Below is a roundup of the major developments in the most active theaters across the globe in the Long War.

Pakistan: The Taliban and al-Qaeda have made startling gains in Pakistan during 2006. In the tribal areas along the Afghan border, the Taliban and al-Qaeda have officially taken control over North Waziristan with the signing of the Waziristan Accord in September, and unofficially taken control of South Waziristan after the Pakistani Army abandoned control of the agency. The Taliban has established offices, recruiting centers, a parallel governing administration, and allowed al-Qaeda and other foreign fighters to live in the region. Twenty-two known al-Qaeda training camps exist in the tribal areas. After the Waziristan Accord, Pakistan released over 2,500 Taliban, al-Qaeda and other jihadi prisoners, many of whom fled back to the tribal areas to rejoin or lead their units. The Taliban also maintain a command and control center in Quetta in the south. The Taliban and al-Qaeda recruit, arm, train, sortie and direct their attacks from the tribal area and Quetta.

The Pakistani government is exploring further 'peace accords' in the tribal agencies, and Bajaur would have been the next agency ceded to the Taliban and al-Qaeda had not a missile strike on a madrassa hosting an al-Qaeda training camp sabotaged the talks. The foiled London airliner plot was tracked back to Waziristan, as was the Mumbai, India bombing which killed over 200 railway commuters.

Afghanistan: The Taliban have stepped up military operations and suicide and bombing attacks in Afghanistan. While the Taliban continues to claim their movement is supported locally, the impetus of the Taliban offensive is provided from the Taliban and al-Qaeda support bases in western Pakistan. The overwhelming violence and Taliban activity in Afghanistan occurs on the eastern border with Pakistan. The Taliban have been attacking border outposts, police stations and district centers in formations as large as battalion sized (about 400 fighters). But massed Taliban have led to massive Taliban casualties at the hands of NATO forces. Over 4,000 have been killed in Afghanistan this year, but at least 3,500 are Taliban fighters. Afghan, Canadian, British and U.S. forces have been heavily engaged in the southern and eastern provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, Kunar, Khost, Paktia and Paktika. An al-Qaeda suicide cell in Kabul was broken up by Afghan police after a two month bombing campaign over the summer. Many military and political leaders predict 2007 will be a violent year in Afghanistan as the Taliban attempts to destabilize the Afghan government and sideline reconstruction projects.

Iraq: Since the destruction of the Golden Dome of the Al-Askaria Mosque in Samarra, the sectarian violence has risen dramatically. After the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, command of Al-Qaeda in Iraq was passed to Abu Ayyub al-Masri, a protege of Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al-Qaeda is attempting to create a political front and put an Iraqi face on the insurgency. Under the leadership of of Abu Omar al-Iraqi, al-Qaeda is attempting to unite the fractious insurgent groups in the Sunni areas, and has created an umbrella political organization called the Islamic State of Iraq. Some smaller Sunni insurgent groups, along with some leaders of Iraqi tribes, have been rolled under the banner of the Islamic State of Iraq, along with al-Qaeda in Iraq's Mujahideen Shura Council.

Muqtada al-Sadr and his Iranian backed Mahdi Army continue to lead the sectarian violence in Baghdad and efforts to sideline Sadr from political power have so far failed. An Iraqi government was formed after months of painful negotiations to create a ruling Shia coalition, and power was peacefully transferred. There are real concerns about the willingness of the Iraqi government of Nouri al-Maliki to disarm the Shia militias. The Iraqi Army has made significant progress in taking control of the battlespace, yet is still heavily dependent on US forces. In general, the Iraqi police has a long way to go before approaching the effectiveness of the Army. The Baghdad police are said to be riddled with militias. Saddam Hussein was executed on December 30, 2006.

Somalia: After a year of seemingly wild success in Somalia, al-Qaeda has suffered a serious blow. The al-Qaeda backed Islamic Courts had taken control over all of central and southern Somalia by July, save for the central town of Baidoa, after defeating the U.S. backed Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism. Ethiopian forces poured into Baidoa and Puntland to reinforce the weak Transitional Federal Government. A five month standoff ensued, then in late December the two sides faced off outside Baidoa. The Islamic Courts conducted two suicide strikes against government targets, and successfully ambushed several Ethiopian armored columns. The Ethiopian Army then conducted a major offensive and drove the Islamic Courts from Mogadishu. The Islamic Courts have fled to the southern port of Kismayo and a training camp at Ras Kamboni, and the the Ethiopian Army is currently heading south to engage them. The Islamic Courts have given all signs that it will begin to conduct an insurgency. Al-Qaeda has expended significant resources in funds, manpower, political and propaganda support, and in establishing training bases in Somalia.

Iran: The Islamic Republic of Iran continues to pursue its nuclear program, against the wishes of the United Nations. Iran still shelters over 100 al-Qaeda leaders, including Said bin Laden, Osama's son, and Saif al-Adel, al-Qaeda's strategic planner. Muqtada al-Sadr receives the support of Iran, which is working to destabilize the Iraqi government and fomet civil war. Qods Force agents have been arrested in Iraq with "weapons lists, documents pertaining to shipments of weapons into Iraq, organizational charts, telephone records and maps, among other sensitive intelligence information... [and] information about importing modern, specially shaped explosive charges into Iraq." Hezbollah continues to be Iran's main terrorist proxy, and received significant aid in the form of sophisticated weapons systems, cash and political support. Iranian weapons were fielded during the Israel-Hezbollah War, including a cruise missile which disabled an Israeli warship, medium range rockets, and UAVs. Iran has also supported Somalia's Islamic Courts by providing arms and training to the organization.

North Africa/Algeria: Al-Qaeda consolidated the various Salafist terrorist groups and formed Al-Qaeda in North Africa. The organization consists of the Algerian based GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat), the Moroccan Islamic Combat Group, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, and the Tunisian Combatant Group. While the GSPC isn't a serious threat to the stability of Algeria, the group remains active, has maintained its size and operations, and has conducted attacks against government forces and civilian targets. Moroccan authorities disrupted a major terror plot against foreign targets, and arrested almost 60 in the conspiracy. Al-Qaeda in North Africa and the GSPC maintain an extensive support network in Europe and beyond.

Saudi Arabia: Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia attacked the ARAMCO run Abqaiq facility, the largest in Saudi Arabia. Saudi security forces continue to dismantle al-Qaeda's network of fighters in the country. Saudi Arabia has killed or captured nearly every terrorist on its most wanted lists. But Saudi Arabia continues to allow the support organizations to function. The "Golden Chain," a group of wealthy Saudis and other Gulf states financiers who funnel millions of dollars to Osama bin Laden, still remain free, despite their known identity. Imams and clerics supportive and sympathetic to al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations continue to preach hate and justification for jihad.

Chechnya: Al-Qaeda had a very bad year in Chechnya. Shamil Basayev, the leader of the Chechen jihad, along with a large contingent of the Chechen leadership, was killed by the Russian FSB in July. After Basayev's death, large numbers of Chechen rebels defected and accepted a government amnesty. In November, Doku Umarov, Basayev's successor, was wounded after Russian forces conducted an assault on his hideout. Just days later, Abu Hafs, al-Qaeda's Emir of Chechnya, was killed by Russian security services. Russian intelligence believed he was prepared to leave Chechnya... "given the lack of prospects for jihad in the North Caucasus."

The Philippines: The Filipino Army has made significant progress in its fight against al-Qaeda linked Abu Sayyaf and Indonesian based Jemaah Islamiyah operating in the southern Sulu archipelago. A force of about 6,000 Marines are fighting Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah on Jolo Island, and are highly confident Khaddafy Janjalani, the leader of Abu Sayyaf, was killed during the operation. Jemaah Islamiyah leader Umar Patek was believed to have been wounded, and the wife of JI bomb expert Dulmatin was arrested and deported to Indonesia. Abu Sayyaf and JI have continued to conduct a low-level bombing campaign, largely in Mindanao. The Filipino government continues to conduct negotiations with the Muslim separatist group MILF.

Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah still remains active in Indonesia and throughout southeast Asia, although it has not conducted major attacks inside the country. The Indonesian Supreme Court overturned the conviction of Abu Bakar Bashir, the spiritual leader of al-Qaeda affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah who sanctioned the Bali bombings. Over 60 terrorists were released from jail, including several involved in the Bali bombing. Jemaah Islamiyah still maintains a support base and training camps inside Indonesia.

Bangladesh: Bangladesh was successful in decapitating the senior leadership of the Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh during the spring. Abdur Rahman and Bangla Bhai, the two most senior leaders of JMB were captured. Abdur Rahman was an original signatory of al-Qaeda's 1998 fatwa against the West and the establishment of the International Islamic Front. All together, five of the seven members of JMB's Majlis-e-Shura (central council) are now in custody. Bangladesh is still a haven for al-Qaeda and Pakistani based terrorist groups.

Thailand: Thailand's shadowy Muslim insurgency in the south has stepped up its campaign of terror. Teachers and schools have been the primary targets of insurgents, as 110 schools have been burned and 71 school teachers, administrators and school staff have been killed over the past year. On New Years Eve, a bombing campaign in the capital of Bangkok was successful in stopping Thailand's massive New Years Eve celebrations. Gerakan Mujahideen Pattani, a Muslim terrorist group in Thailand, has received backing from Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qaeda.

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Green Rage

Thursday, January 4, 2007
Radical environmentalists are caught between their love of the Earth. trespass of the law, and the U.S Government's war on terror

PEOPLE LIKE TO THINK of the courtroom as a crucible of justice, but to me it's always seemed a diluter of passions. The atmosphere is restrained, so respectful and genteel it's easy to forget that people's lives hang in the balance. The system has a way of straining out emotion. It is designed to objectify, to control the soaring passions that created the need for the courtroom in the first place. The perpetrators and the

victims pour their passions into the settling ponds of the attorneys, and the attorneys, in turn, pour the diluted stuff into the deep vessel of the judge, and, by extension, into the even deeper water of The System.

If you sat in the gallery of a federal courtroom in my hometown of Eugene, Oregon, last summer and watched as six young men and women entered guilty pleas in a string of environmentally motivated arsons—crimes that the federal government describes as the most egregious environmental terrorism in the nation's history—you might have wondered where the passion had gone. One by one, in a windowless chamber, the defendants answered perfunctory questions posed by Judge Ann Aiken, who sat Oz-like in the highest chair. One by one, they listened to descriptions of the crimes they were accused of committing. One by one, they accepted the government's offer of plea bargains, and one by one, they said the word.

"Guilty."

Kevin Tubbs, thirty-seven, an animal rights activist who migrated to Eugene from Nebraska, mumbled the word and shook his head. Kendall Tankersley, twenty-nine, who holds a degree in molecular biology, choked it out through a gathering sob. Stanislas Meyerhoff, twenty-nine, who wants to study auto mechanics, said it with an odd sort of let's-get-this-over-with politeness. They addressed Judge Aiken as "your honor" and "ma'am."

In the gallery, reporters scribbled. Federal prosecutors with American flag pins affixed to somber blue suits looked on dispassionately. Sentencing dates were set, and the prosecutors, seeking lengthy terms, asked the judge to employ guidelines issued under counter-terrorism laws when considering how much time each should serve.

The crimes to which the six confessed included seventeen attacks, all but one of them arson or attempted arson. The actions took place in five western states between 1996 and 2001. No one was injured. Sport utility vehicles were burned at a Eugene car dealership. So was a meat-packing plant in Redmond, Oregon. Other targets included federal facilities in Wyoming and California and Oregon, where wild horses and burros were let loose and buildings burned down. And in the most notorious action, a spectacular nighttime blaze high in the Rockies destroyed several structures at the Vail ski area. Many of the attacks were followed by communiqués issued under the banner of the Earth Liberation Front, a shadowy, leaderless offshoot of the group Earth First!, and by its sister group, the Animal Liberation Front.

Prosecutors say those who did the crimes took extraordinary means to conceal their involvement. They met in secret gatherings they called "book club" meetings, discussing details such as computer security, target surveillance, and lock-picking. They required that each attendee describe actions they took to avoid detection while traveling to the meeting sites. They used nicknames and code words. They called their criminal actions "camping trips," and dubbed the timing devices they attached to incendiary bombs "hamburgers."

"Terrorism is terrorism—no matter the motive," FBI director Robert Mueller said in January 2006, after the Bush administration announced indictments in an investigation it calls Operation Backfire. "The FBI is committed to protecting Americans from all crime and all terrorism, including acts of domestic terrorism on behalf of animal rights or the environment."

Many were appalled. How could anyone possibly use that singularly loaded word to describe these acts? Where is the moral equivalence between burning an SUV in the dead of night (and doing as much as you can, given the nature of the business at hand, to see that no one gets hurt) and ramming a 767 into a skyscraper? When Eugene's daily newspaper, the Register-Guard, used the word eco-terrorism to describe the investigation, at least one reader took its editors to task, writing that the paper "appears to confuse arson occurring within the context of a nonviolent campaign with terrorism." The paper opted for the softer-sounding eco-sabotage thereafter.

Chelsea Dawn Gerlach is twenty-nine now. Under the terms of her plea bargain, she'll likely spend ten years in prison—assuming she cooperates with government prosecutors as they continue their investigation. If she had been found guilty at trial of all the government had accused her of, she could have been given a life sentence. (Federal prosecutors are seeking life sentences for the majority of those indicted in the Operation Backfire investigation, yet, according to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, the average sentence for arsonists in 2003 was just around seven years.) Along with Meyerhoff, Gerlach is an alum of South Eugene High, a school with a sterling reputation in the heart of Eugene's liberal, affluent south side. In fact, all six of those who entered guilty pleas had close ties to Eugene, as did four others who awaited trial at the time of this writing and three more who had fled the country.

By the time she was in her early twenties, Gerlach had come to believe that Western culture was having a ruinous effect on the global environment, that the Earth faced environmental catastrophe. She felt compelled to do something about it. At some point, passion and frustration drove her over the boundary of her country's laws. Playing by the rules, it seemed, was doing no damn good. At some point, according to the details of her plea bargain, she found herself at the base of Vail Mountain, watching flames light the night sky, awaiting the return of another ELF operative, Bill Rodgers, who had set the fires. Two days later, she found herself at the Denver Public Library, composing a claim of responsibility on a computer that couldn't be traced to her. The message said ELF took the action "on behalf of the lynx," whose habitat would be harmed by an expansion at Vail. "For your safety and convenience, we strongly advise skiers to choose other destinations until Vail cancels its inexcusable plans for expansion," Gerlach wrote.

Skiers did not stop coming to Vail. The arson attack sparked a wildfire of popular condemnation that was directed toward those responsible and, by unfair association, toward more mainstream environmentalists who had also been fighting the expansion. Ultimately, Vail's owners got $12 million from their insurers and the expansion whistled through.

Last summer, in that Eugene courtroom, Gerlach reached her day of reckoning with the system. She, too, said the word. "Guilty." Then she asked the judge if she could read a statement. Gerlach, who has straight black hair and a round, welcoming face, gathered herself and took a deep breath. The words tumbled out in a rush:

"These acts were motivated by a deep sense of despair and anger at the deteriorating state of the global environment and the escalating inequities within society. But I realized years ago this was not an effective or appropriate way to effect positive change. I now know that it is better to act from love than from anger, better to create than destroy, and better to plant gardens than to burn down buildings."

Gerlach admitted to participating in nine of the seventeen attacks described in the government's indictment. In addition to the Vail arson, she served as a lookout as other operatives put incendiary devices next to a meat-packing plant in Eugene; she tried to burn down a Eugene Police Department substation; she participated in an ELF arson that did more than $1 million in damage at an Oregon tree farm that grew genetically modified poplar trees; she helped topple an electrical transmission tower in the sagebrush-and-juniper country east of Bend. And on Christmas night in 1999, she sat in a van that she and her friends had named "Betty" and served as lookout as others placed buckets of diesel fuel next to a Boise Cascade office in Monmouth, Oregon. The buckets ignited and destroyed an eight-thousand-square-foot building, doing $1 million in damage. Then Gerlach sent out an ELF communiqué: "Let this be a lesson to all greedy multinational corporations who don't respect ecosystems. The elves are watching."

THE FIRST TIME I CAME TO EUGENE I wondered what all the fuss was about. I knew its reputation well—a university town, a hotbed of liberal activism, home to Ken Kesey and other '60s holdouts. But when I drove through the arterials and back streets on the north side of the city I realized that much of Eugene is just plain old suburbia—ranch homes, tidy lawns, and conservative values.

After a decade of living and working in Eugene, I know this about the place: It's a slice of America, profoundly divided along fault lines of politics, values, and culture. On the south side of the Willamette River, which bisects the city, you'll find the liberal Eugene of renown, full of University of Oregon faculty and tie-dyed hippies who attend the freewheeling Oregon Country Fair each July. Conservative Eugene is on the north side of the river, full of satellite dishes and American flags and folks who favor the traditional charms of the Lane County Fair in August.

There are divisions within the divisions, just as there are in America at large. There are monied fiscal conservatives and working-class Bush supporters. There are affluent liberals who vote Democrat and there are the more disheveled activists who have no patience for the compromises made by mainstream liberals. Those who committed the ELF arsons, and their supporters, come from this latter milieu.

If there is a physical heart of the radical environmental movement in Eugene, it is a leafy precinct of old wooden houses just west of downtown, known as the Whiteaker neighborhood. An outsider—someone from, say, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, or St. Petersburg, Florida, or Provo, Utah, or from any of a thousand bastions of conventional American culture, including many corners of Eugene—might fixate on a curbside cardboard box offering "free stuff," or a do-your-own-thing piece of art in a front yard, a dreadlocked couple strolling hand in hand, a FUCK BUSH sign, a flash of tattooed flesh, a braless woman, a pair of ratty Carhartt cutoffs, a pierced tongue, eyebrow, nose, belly button, or neck, and feel a skosh uncomfortable.

Whiteaker rose to national prominence in 1999, after perhaps a couple dozen of its residents—young adults who described themselves as anarchists—helped foment the lawlessness at the World Trade Organization conference in Seattle. Suddenly "the Eugene anarchists" were a cause célèbre.


Reporters from the BBC, the Los Angeles Times, CNN, the Wall Street Journal, and other major outlets descended on Eugene, their editors demanding analysis pieces explaining what the hell had happened in Seattle. In Eugene, there was a good deal of uneasy eye-rolling. Local civic leaders reacted with a mix of revulsion and denial to the notion that their city was Anarchy Central. The consensus was that the whole thing had been blown out of proportion.

No one knows how many anarchists there really are in Whiteaker; they don't keep membership rolls. At least some of those who donned black garb in Seattle were kids doing what kids the world over often do: immerse themselves in an adrenaline-charged cause that's greater than oneself. Not all of Eugene's anarchists are callow youths, though. Some are genuine, steadfastly committed, and deep-thinking.

Eugene's brand of anarchy is "green anarchy." Unlike old-style industrialist anarchists, green anarchists are primarily concerned with the effects of civilization on the global environment. They are more radical in their thought than, say, Marxists are. They would certainly agree that capital accumulates in a fashion that creates a wealthy elite at the expense of the exploited masses, but their critique goes far beyond that. Their central precept is not that civilization needs to be reconstructed, but rather that it needs to be overthrown in its entirety and never replaced. Things started to go wrong, they contend, when humans first domesticated plants and animals.

The nexus between the green anarchists, the Earth Liberation Front, and those ensnared in the government's investigation is not perfect. Several of the defendants don't claim to be advocates of the green anarchy movement now, if they ever were. And some of them, it seems, had not thought through the intellectual justifications of their actions in a formal sense—perhaps they just felt in their gut that things like SUVs and animal slaughterhouses and plantations that grow genetically modified trees were wrong. Whatever their motivations, their actions and rhetoric match up quite well with the principles of the green anarchist philosophy.

If they are in need of intellectual mentorship, Eugene's green anarchists have a resource close at hand. John Zerzan is in his sixties, a graduate of Stanford and San Francisco State University and one of the foremost anticivilization thinkers in the world. In the '60s he was a Marxist and a Maoist and a Vietnam protester and a devotee of the Haight-Ashbury psychedelic scene. He now believes that Paleolithic humans and the few remaining primitive cultures provide the best models for how humans should subsist. His books include Elements of Refusal, Future Primitive, and Against Civilization: Readings and Reflections. He is an editor of Green Anarchy, which calls itself "an anticivilization journal of theory and action." He was a confidant of Theodore Kaczynski during the Unabomber trial.

On a sunny afternoon last summer, I sat down with Zerzan on his shady back deck. His house is small and tidy, a wooden bungalow that sits near a busy one-way just south of the Whiteaker neighborhood. I asked him if he thought too much had been made of the Eugene anarchists after the WTO riots.

"60 Minutes was here. You can't say that would have happened just because we have a good idea," he said. Then he switched to the recent indictments. "All of the people who have been arrested in this thing used to live here in Eugene. There was a lot happening here, and that whole neighborhood [Whiteaker] was the key part. Now it's quieter."

I had never before spoken with Zerzan, although I knew that he lived in Eugene; around town, he's taken for granted in the way that minor celebrities who live in small cities often are. He has a salt-and-pepper beard, straight bangs, and a quiet, almost patrician demeanor that I found disarming. He seems younger than his age.

I asked him if he thought the arsons outlined in the government's indictment had done any good. He pointed out that most of the actions were followed by anonymous communiqués explaining precisely why the actions were taken. The combination of action and explanation can be quite powerful, he said.

Zerzan clearly struggles with the question of violence. Of Kaczynski, he said he found him "lacking in the basic kind of human connection that most people have." He hopes that the anticivilization movement will prevail without great bloodshed, although he quickly adds "my anarchist friends mainly laugh at me for being too hopeful." Humans, he believes, may very well forge a new way of living on Earth, or, rather, return to old ways of living on Earth, before utter environmental collapse imposes a Malthusian end.

"You can't make the revolution happen by promising people less," he said. Then he swept his hand out in front of him, taking in his house, the sound of cars and trucks hurtling past, the hum of the city, of human civilization. "You can't say all of this is more. This is becoming more sterile and cold and fucked up by the minute."

DOWN AT SAM BOND'S GARAGE, in the heart of Whiteaker, organic beer is served up in old jam jars. Tots in hemp smocks frolic on the wooden floor. A black t-shirt hangs on a wall sporting a skull and crossbones on the front and "Whiteaker" in pirate scrawl beneath.

It's a Sunday night in June, and the place is filling up fast. There's a disco ball hanging from old wooden rafters in the eatery's barnlike interior space. Two large ceiling fans beat the air, but a thermometer on the wall reports eighty-three degrees nonetheless. The usual customers, the ones who just came by for beers or a bite to eat or to chat with friends, seem a bit bewildered by the gathering crowd. A middle-aged man shoulders up to the bar to settle his tab and a young woman inquires if he's here for the rally. When the man asks what rally, she says, "It's for Free Luers. He got twenty-three years for burning up three SUVs." Soon the hall is full, a standing-room-only crowd of perhaps two hundred.

Jeffrey "Free" Luers is a skinny kid from suburban Los Angeles who is serving his fifth year in prison. In 2000, when he was twenty-one, Luers and an accomplice were arrested for setting fire to three SUVs in the middle of the night at a car lot near the University of Oregon (a separate action from those included in the Operation Backfire indictment). A Eugene judge sentenced Luers, who refused all of the government's plea bargain offers, to nearly twenty-three years in prison. The authorities say they made an example of Luers to forestall further crimes; activists say they made a martyr of him. Luers remains unrepentant. In a recent message to his supporters, he said, "I got careless, I got sloppy. I slipped up. I got caught."

I find a seat at the bar and order an ale. An acquaintance recognizes me and squeezes over to say hello. He points to a man sitting at a table in the center of the hall. Amid the young tattooed-and-pierced set and the older pony-tailed-and-sandaled set, this man is conspicuous. He looks as if he just walked in from an engineering convention. He has a conservative haircut, wears chino slacks, and keeps his reading glasses tucked in his left shirt-pocket. He's perhaps in his late sixties, and sits next to his tastefully dressed, bespectacled wife.

"That's Luers's dad," my friend says, and then pauses. "Just think—he'll probably never see his son

out of prison again."

The elder Luers, whose name is John, shuffles up to a small stage at one end of the room. He leans on a cane as he walks. Rallies for his son have been held annually for the past few years, and Luers notes that this is one of forty-three around the world on this day. "The crowds just keep getting bigger," John Luers says. "We are so grateful for the support you have shown our son."

I introduce myself later and ask if he speaks with writers and he says politely but firmly, "No we don't."

There are other speakers. Jeffrey Luers may be the poster child of the government's crackdown on so-called environmental terrorists, but this night most are preoccupied with the recent arrests. This crowd refers to the government's Operation Backfire investigation as The Green Scare, seeing it as an all-out effort to discourage environmental activism and dissent. Many have been interrogated by FBI agents, and many believe their phones are tapped.

One of the organizers of the rally speaks up and says "we know what real terrorism is" to loud applause. Misha Dunlap of the Civil Liberties Defense Center, a Eugene nonprofit that has lent assistance to Luers and to the more recent defendants, gives an update. Then anticivilization author and thinker Derrick Jensen takes the stage. He asks any FBI agents in the audience to please raise their hands. When no one does, he shrugs and says, "Worth a try." Then he says, "What you're doing is wrong and I plan on seeing you brought to justice." More applause and a few boisterous hoots. Jensen speaks for more than an hour about environmental holocaust and resistance, and the audience is rapt.

When someone mentions the name Jake Ferguson, the room erupts in a chorus of hisses. Ferguson, a former Whiteaker insider, is the government's primary informant in the Operation Backfire case. He has not been charged in any of the crimes, but has admitted to being a key operative in many of them. He agreed to wear hidden recording devices when speaking with fellow activists, and now his name is anathema in Whiteaker—a stop sign just a few blocks from Sam Bond's has been defaced to read STOP JAKE.

Ferguson may bear the epithet "snitch," but many radical activists consider the six who have accepted plea bargains to be snitches too. Still, there is an unmistakable aroma of violence in the green anarchists' attitude toward Ferguson. A typical posting on the Portland Independent Media Center website, which has served as a clearinghouse among activists for information and commentary on the Operation Backfire case, described Ferguson as "the worst type of scum on earth." Another writer added, "jake admitted being a snitch to people in the community after the story broke. why he can still talk is a good question." (It's worth noting, though, that Ferguson had suffered no physical harm at the time of this writing, at least not to my knowledge. The talk may be streetwise and tough, but the vast majority of Eugene's radical activists would never intentionally harm another person or animal.)

I leave Sam Bond's before the music starts—a hip-hop duo is on the bill. Outside, the night air is cool. It feels good to be out of that space, not just because of the stiffling heat, but because of the intensity in the room.

I find my car and drive through the quiet streets of Whiteaker. Downtown is empty except for a trio of homeless youths hanging out on a corner by the city library. The curtains are drawn in most of the homes in my own south side neighborhood. The crowd at Sam Bond's may be ready for the revolution, but the rest of the world just seems to want a good night's sleep.

THE OPERATION BACKFIRE INDICTMENT is sixty-five pages long and identifies the first building the Eugene arsonists burned down as the Oakridge Ranger Station, just up the road from Eugene. On the night of October 30, 1996, a motorist saw the flames and called 911. When firefighters drove into the parking lot, nails stuck in the tires of their trucks. The building was too far gone to save. By morning, it was a pile of cinders.

The Oakridge arson was one of the first subjects I wrote about after returning to my native Northwest. I had just left a job as a newspaper reporter on the East Coast, and had taken another job, editing a small magazine that covers National Forest issues. Nothing like this had ever happened in Oregon. People were shocked.

Within the region and throughout the federal government the presumption was immediate. This was the work of environmental extremists. Two nights earlier, someone had torched a Forest Service pickup truck at a ranger station seventy miles to the north, and had left graffiti including "Forest Rapers" and "Earth Liberation Front." They had also scrawled the letter A with an extended crossbar—the symbol of the anarchist movement. No one claimed responsibility for the Oakridge fire, but many people assumed both acts were done by the same people.

Dan Glickman, President Clinton's Secretary of Agriculture, who oversaw the Forest Service, told reporters then that he had "absolutely no tolerance for individuals or groups that engage in terrorism." Jack Ward Thomas, who was chief of the Forest Service, said, "This is what people do who do not understand how to operate in a democracy."

But to me, and to many in the mainstream environmental community, these assumptions made no sense. At the time of the arson, environmentalists had just scored a major victory in the steep forestlands just a few miles away from Oakridge.

In the early 1990s, the Forest Service had proposed a salvage-logging project on the slopes bordering nearby Warner Creek. The area had burned in 1991, leaving behind a patchwork of both blackened wood and healthy trees. When a Eugene judge ruled the Forest Service's plan legal under the notorious Salvage Logging Rider in 1995, protesters sprang into action. They built barricades, dug trenches, and fashioned makeshift structures to keep logging equipment out. Then, in the summer of 1996, after activists had maintained the blockade for nearly a year, the Clinton administration ordered the Forest Service to shelve its plans to log Warner Creek (and more than 150 other controversial sales around the West).

So why would an environmentalist of any stripe decide, just months later, to burn down the Oakridge Ranger Station?

Aboveground activists did all they could to distance themselves from the act. The Oregon Natural Resources Council, fearing a public relations disaster, offered a $1,000 reward to anyone who provided information leading to the conviction of those responsible.

Years passed with no arrests. There were rumors that the fire had been an inside job, the work of a disgruntled employee. The Forest Service built another ranger station, a fetching structure with two stories and broad eaves, in exactly the same spot where the other had stood.

Then, last summer, Kevin Tubbs, one of the six who accepted the government's plea bargain offer, owned up to the deed.

At the Warner Creek blockade, Tubbs, curly-haired and deeply committed to the cause, had kept vigil atop a structure built from logs; if anyone tried to move the thing, he said, it would collapse and send him falling down the steep mountainside to his death. In Eugene's federal courtroom, wearing standard-issue Lane County Jail garb, with close-cropped hair, and looking a little middle-aged, he admitted to this:

On the night of the arson, he drove two fellow activists, Ferguson and Josephine Sunshine Overaker, east from Eugene to the vicinity of the Oakridge Ranger Station and dropped his passengers off. According to the account read in court by U.S. assistant attorney Stephen Peifer, Ferguson and Overaker placed incendiary devices around the ranger station. They threw nails onto the parking lot to slow down emergency responders and then the three drove back toward Eugene. They took back roads to avoid detection. They paused at a covered bridge near the town of Lowell and tossed the gloves they had used while committing the crime into the dark waters of a reservoir. The incendiary devices worked as intended and the ranger station was destroyed.

Despite Tubbs's confession, Timothy Ingalsbee, one of the leaders of the Warner Creek effort, still has trouble accepting the notion that environmentalists burned down the ranger station. Tall and lanky and gentle of manner, Ingalsbee holds a doctorate in environmental sociology from the University of Oregon. After the Warner Creek battle, he had wanted to work with the Forest Service to establish the site as a permanent wildfire research station within the National Forest system. "What the fire did was to destroy that opportunity," he said.

"I had excellent professional relationships with the Oakridge Forest Service staff, and after the fire that ended."

Mainstream environmentalists reacted with the same sense of puzzlement and disgust to the majority of the attacks described in the Operation Backfire investigation. And while many on the left are critical of the aggressiveness with which the federal government has pursued the case—viewing the millions spent as evidence of the Bush administration's overzealousness in its war on terror and a convenient distraction from the failings of the administration to counter real terrorists—virtually no one in the environmental community believes the attacks have done anything but harm.

"It's bad for our cause all around. It stinks," Rocky Smith told High Country News in the days after the Vail attack. Smith, a Colorado environmentalist, had worked tirelessly to fight the Vail expansion through legal means. "There are lots of reasons to hate Vail," he said, "but not enough to justify arson."

SO, WHY? Those who are directly involved in the cases—those who are under indictment or who have accepted plea bargains—won't talk about motives. Most of those who are closest to them won't say anything either. Government prosecutors have indicated that there may be more indictments, and many activists are afraid to talk openly about the actions and those who allegedly committed them.

It's hard, though, to escape the conclusion that the main motivation of the Eugene arsonists was sincere, passionate conviction.

"I believe these arsons were a result of total frustration," one Whiteaker activist who knows several of the defendants told me over coffee. "It's just very painful to witness, so clearly, the rape of the planet."

Consider the story of Bill Rodgers. He was forty at the time of his arrest, making him the oldest of those indicted in the Operation Backfire investigation. Authorities describe him as a ringleader in the group of arsonists—they say he served as a sort of mentor to Gerlach, for one. Police arrested him last December at the modest bookstore and community center he ran in Prescott, Arizona. Two weeks after his arrest, he put a plastic bag over his head and suffocated himself.

In a farewell letter, he wrote, "Certain human cultures have been waging war against the Earth for millennia. I chose to fight on the side of bears, mountain lions, skunks, bats, saguaros, cliff rose and all things wild. I am just the most recent casualty in that war. But tonight I have made a jail break—I am returning home, to the Earth, to the place of my origins."

Here's what activists like Rodgers believe: They believe we face a crisis of mass extinction, caused by civilization. They believe the atmosphere is being spoiled, the climate pitching on the verge of ruinous change, because of civilization. They believe our bodies are being poisoned and so are our spirits, by civilization.

They've considered the state of the planet and they've decided against some hopeful half-critique. They've looked all the way down into the pit and, rightly or wrongly, come to the conclusion that the whole damn thing is undeniably, irretrievably messed up. The government is wrong, mainstream culture is wrong, the tokenist sellout environmental community is wrong, civilization itself is wrong.

The green anarchists are historical determinists, as are Marxists and Christian fundamentalists. Their worldview is based on more, though, than extrapolations of weighty political treatises or divinations of holy texts. It is based on the work of scientists such as E. O. Wilson and Jared Diamond and respected, peer-reviewed biologists and climatologists and ecologists the world over whose work suggests that human activity is having a calamitous effect on the Earth's natural systems.
Globalization. Capitalism. Greed. Civilization. Call it what you will. It will end, the green anarchists insist, whether by means of environmental collapse, violent revolution, or the collective enlightening of human consciousness.

"We are now witnessing the final days of Western Civilization," declared a recent posting on the Portland Independent Media Center website. "As this civilization decays around us—as the wars spread and the natural disasters increase in frequency—and as those trapped by western culture slowly break from their cognitive dissonance and open their hearts and minds, a new reality will begin to reveal itself. Our task is to let this transformation take its course, and to speed it along where we can."

History is littered with historical determinists who were convinced the revolution was just around the corner. A few were right, most were wrong. And history is full of social upheavals in which true believers decided the cause was so great that they would step beyond the boundaries of law. Some have been vindicated by history, some scorned.

When I consider the ELF arsonists, I find myself thinking of the militant nineteenth-century abolitionist John Brown. So appalled was Brown by the institution of slavery that he tried to spark a revolution. He thought all that was needed was a firm nudge and the whole South would erupt in a slave rebellion. He was wrong, and was caught. His actions enraged the southern populace, and the system against which he struggled prosecuted him, convicted him, and hanged him.

At the time he was viewed as a crazed visionary whose quixotic strivings had changed nothing. But as the forces of abolition gained strength—as the real revolution unfolded—he became something much more potent. He became a symbol. Over the course of decades, what was first considered lunacy and extremism came to be regarded as courage and righteousness.

Years from now, when we have a clearer understanding of the full damage we have done to the Earth, is it possible the ELF arsonists will be remembered in similar fashion?